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INTRODUCTION
Originally identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, SARS-CoV-2 has become a pandemic
owing to a long period of incubation, a high number of asymptomatic cases, and high international
mobility. Here we consider the unique conjunction of events that allowed this new coronavirus to
emerge and create a pandemic. We urge governments to learn from SARS and COVID-19 and to
implement preparedness for pandemics to come.
AN UNPREDICTABLE ACCIDENT
Following the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 (1, 2) in China, causing COVID-19, the remaining
question is whether we could have been ready for it after learning from the SARS epidemic
in 2003. It is not possible to predict the emergence of an infectious disease because it is an
accidental process, i.e., the occurrence of a very low probability event resulting from the stochastic
conjunction of independent low probability events (3). Even if the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak was
unpredictable, we should have been able to prevent it because some features are consistent with
previous coronaviruses outbreaks.
CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF AN INFECTIOUS
DISEASE
For an infectious disease to emerge, three conditions must be fulfilled. One is of biological nature:
the pathogen causing the outbreak must be compatible with humans, i.e., must be able to infect and
reproduce in humans (Condition 1). The other two conditions are anthropogenic. First, there must
be contact between humans and the pathogen reservoir (condition 2), and, secondly, a human-
to-human urban cycle must be possible (condition 3). COVID-19 exemplifies all three conditions
(Figure 1), but this is true for all zoonoses.
CLOSELY RELATED VIRUSES
SARS-CoV, which caused SARS in 2003, and SARS-CoV-2, which is responsible for COVID-19, are
very closely related Sarbecoviruses. Furthermore, SARS-CoV-2 is closely related (96% similarity)
to the Sarbecovirus MN996532_raTG13 from the Chinese horseshoe bat Rhinolophus affinis (4).
Although 3,200 CoVs circulate in bats (5), it is worth noting that the SARS and COVID-19
pandemics were caused by two very closely related Sarbecoviruses found in Chinese bats. This
suggests a specific ability of these Sarbecoviruses to affect humans (condition 1). However, there is
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also a specific societal environment fulfilling conditions 2 and 3
that led to the COVID-19 epidemic and pandemic.
THE “PLANETARY ALIGNMENT” THAT
TRIGGERED COVID-19
The emergence of COVID-19 is the result of an exceptional
“planetary alignment,” a specific coincidence of unrelated natural
and societal traits (Figure 1). This leads to condition 2, contact.
Although it cannot be excluded, there is no evidence of
direct coronavirus infection of humans from bats (6, 7). Civets
and dromedaries were intermediate species for SARS and
the unrelated MERS coronavirus disease in the Middle East,
respectively (8, 9). Similarly, an intermediate animal might
have been involved in the emergence of COVID-19. SARS-
CoV-2 could possibly infect pangolin, cat, civet, cow, buffalo,
swine, goat, sheep, and pigeon (10). Pangolin was mentioned
as a potential intermediate, but it is not formally established.
COVID-19 is officially considered to have emerged at theHuanan
seafood wholesale market (HSWM) in Wuhan in December
2019. However, epidemiological data show that early cases of
COVID-19 were not related to HSWM and thus that it is not
the site of emergence (11–15). Phylogenetic studies suggest that
SARS-CoV-2 might have circulated inWuhan as early as October
2019 and that the virus then spread at low-level from person
to person (the latency phase), before being imported to HSWM
where it was detected in December 2019 (13–15). The location
of the first human infection will most likely remain unknown.
Contamination through traditional medicine, pets, or any other
contact event between humans and the source of the virus,
including the handling of viruses in a laboratory (16), must be
considered. The initial contact might also have taken place in
farms, since anthropized rural areas offer favorable environments
for the transmission of coronaviruses (3). In this latency phase,
the infection remained silent, spreading in a stochastic way
within the population, with no epidemic identified yet.
Condition 3 was fulfilled when considering the specific
societal context ofWuhan at the end of 2019 and the beginning of
2020. To move from the latency phase to the epidemic phase, an
amplification process must occur to reach the threshold needed
to trigger an epidemic. The outbreak was initially detected in
the Jiang’an district, which is home to the environmentally-
conscious Baibuting urban community, which holds a traditional
folk festival known as Wan Jia Yan or Great Family Feast every
year (17, 18). The 20th such event, organized on January 18, 2020,
coincided with the very popular Lunar New Year celebration.
More than 40,000 families, who prepared about 14,000 traditional
dishes, attended Wan Jia Yan in January 2020 (19). Shops and
markets registered a huge attendance of people buying fresh
food and, thus, imported and stored large amounts of food,
including living animals, in preparation for these events. What
triggered the epidemic is the simultaneous occurrence of two
major celebrations in the same place, bringing many people
into contact with the initially infected persons and providing
the amplification phase needed. Another key step was mobility.
The Chinese New Year is associated with an outbound mass
mobilization known as Chun Yun, and Wuhan is both the
heart of the Yangtze River Economic Belt and a major national
hub in China known as “the gateway of nine provinces.” An
estimated 5 million people left Wuhan during Chun Yun in
2020 (20). Furthermore, Wuhan welcomes 1.2 million college
students (21), whose mobility during holidays is extremely high.
Outbound traveling from Wuhan may explain why Wenzhou,
in the neighboring province of Zhejiang, became one of the
most severely affected areas (22). At that stage, it was too late
to stop the epidemic, and measures could not be anything but
post-event reactions (Figure 1). The expansion was driven in
secondary foci by people who moved from the initial location
of the epidemic. In each of these foci, the same processes
of latency, amplification, and epidemic were reiterated with
variable delays. This is why SARS-CoV-2 was not stopped despite
drastic measures of containment and quarantine. The next step,
global dissemination, was only a matter of dissemination due to
intensive international mobility and global international trade.
WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN?
Drastic countermeasures for containment were implemented
worldwide as a response to COVID-19 that strongly and durably
impacted both society and economy but did not efficiently
stop the pandemic. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is
unprecedented in our modern civilization. One must go back to
the Spanish flu or black plague in the Middle Ages to find similar
societal impacts. Society today is globalized, driven by social
networks, and connected with information flowing in real time.
This leads to over-reactions, with irreversible damage to society.
COVID-19 is the first “4.0 pandemic.” Society cannot allow this
situation to repeat in the future and must adapt to implement a
different action plan, not based on post-event reactions as done
today but rather on preventive actions.
Nothing can be done to avoid the circulation of coronaviruses
in the wild (sylvatic cycle). However, the animal intermediate
does not need to be identified since human activities are
responsible for the emergence and propagation of the zoonosis.
The focus must be on these human activities because they can
be properly organized. The invariables in both the SARS and
COVID-19 epidemics are the presence of living wild animals
for trade, food, or medicine, the presence of amplifying nodes
like markets (wet or not), large social events, and mobile
subpopulations. Following the emergence of COVID-19, the
Chinese Government put a ban on the trade and consumption
of wild animals, just like after the SARS crisis in 2003–2004.
However, these practices are deeply anchored in traditions and
are very difficult to proscribe. This is not limited to China or
Asia, and the consumption of wild animals is traditional in all
continents. Banning wetmarkets had already been recommended
after the SARS crisis (16), but it is not possible in reality,
and there is a risk of encouraging illegal markets, with loss
of control. For example, following an enforced ban on poultry
export from Thailand, the avian influenza H5N1 virus spread
widely in Cambodia due to illegal trade from Vietnam through
middlemen and wet markets (23, 24). It seems more acceptable
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FIGURE 1 | Dynamic of COVID-19. The emergence of an infectious disease is an accidental process that cannot be predicted. An unidentified animal or animal parts
contaminated by a virus initially originating from bats, i.e., SARS-CoV-2, was brought into contact with humans in October–November 2019, starting a latent infection.
The main drivers of the epidemic and then of the pandemic are human mobility during the incubation phase and the amplification effect of markets, while the
extension into a pandemic was due to the dimensions and speed of mobility of goods and people in our global world. However, this did not trigger the outbreak. What
favored the epidemic and then the pandemic is the exceptional conjunction in Wuhan of several independent and aggravating events: (i) the occurrence of three major
celebrations in a short time, for which the demand of food and natural products was exceptionally high in December 2019; (ii) the resulting movement and storage of
large amounts of food including living animals in December 2019; (iii) the very high attendance of markets in December 2019, generating an amplification loop; (iv) very
high human mobility for the holidays in January 2020; (v) intensive international mobility of goods and people in January and February 2020; (vi) a long period of silent
incubation of SARS-CoV-2. Text in red corresponds to situations where no action can be undertaken. Text and boxes in deep green correspond to situations where
preventive actions MUST be implemented to prevent future emergence of SARS-related coronaviruses. Crosses in deep green indicate major transmission steps that
can be blocked. Text and boxes in violet correspond to situations where post-event reactions are currently implemented but which cannot prevent a pandemic.
for governments to replace traditional wet markets by modern
buildings with the standards of department stores where no
living animals should be stored and sold. Although obvious,
this is very difficult to implement and must be accompanied
by strong political actions. It is essential to ban the use of
protected species and to enforce this prohibition but also to offer
alternatives: (1) traditional pharmacopeia shops must be under
government control; (2) the products sold must be validated
by an official Academy; (3) full traceability, quality, and safety
controls must be mandatory and internationally controlled, and
(4) of upmost importance, products must be subsidized to ensure
highly competitive prices to prevent a black market. In addition,
customers should not be in contact with food, which should be
provided by properly equipped staff members. It will also be
necessary to ensure that farm animals do not end up in contact
with wildlife.
BEYOND COVID-19
Although we specifically address COVID-19 and further
Sarbecovirus pandemics here, examples and recommendations
go far beyond. A future Sarbecovirus emergence will certainly
involve East Asia due to the specific ecology of this group
of viruses and their bat hosts. However, other epidemics can
be triggered elsewhere. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) is caused by a highly pathogenic Merbecovirus, a
different Betacoronavirus, with a death rate of 34.7% (25, 26).
MERS emerged in the Arabic Peninsula, with dromedaries
as intermediate hosts, but the origin is found in African
dromedaries and bats (27, 28). Countries from the Horn of Africa
are breeding and trading dromedaries in the Arabic peninsula
(27). The trade of live camels provided the amplification
loop needed for the emergence of the disease. The emergence
of a pandemic could happen in Africa through another
intermediate host if an accidental amplification loop occurs.
Another example comes from a different kind of virus: the
mosquito-borne arboviruses. Their expansion is a consequence
of the global economy and international trade, which led to
the establishment of competent mosquito vectors, i.e., Aedes
albopictus and Aedes aegypti, in many countries worldwide,
including Europe. Large epidemics can then be triggered by
international human mobility. This favored the emergence
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of Dengue, Chikungunya, and Zika in regions of the world
where these viruses were absent, and it could happen again in
the future.
THE THREAT IS GLOBAL, BUT THE
ANSWER IS LOCAL
Other pandemics will happen. It is just a matter of probability
and time. Currently, the risk of emergence is mostly coming
from coronaviruses, arboviruses, and influenza viruses. Influenza
is given considerable scrutiny, and vaccines are available, making
coronaviruses and arboviruses the main threat. We should,
whenever possible, address the threat before it is recognized
as a disease. Instead, all official actions taken today are post-
event reactions, only aiming at reducing the progression of
the disease. At this stage, the infectious agent has already
spread, mostly during the incubation phase, and it is too
late to efficiently stop it, whereas irreversible damage is being
inflicted on people, society, and economies. A country is nothing
else than the sum of her communities, and while rules must
be international with a national liability for enforcement, the
implementation must be delocalized to the community level.
Different diseases will require different preventive actions, but
these actions will all be efficient and easy to implement if
they are managed at the community level. Whether it is
the recommendations mentioned above for coronaviruses or
control of mosquitoes, the community is the place where
monitoring and preventive actions can be implemented quickly,
efficiently, and at the lowest cost. International institutions and
foundations can support low-income countries to implement
this first range of local preventive measures. Indeed, the
implementation of such recommendations will be far less
expensive than the current cost of containment and devastation
to the economy, which is counted in thousands of billions.
Preparedness and education is therefore the utmost priority.
It should be an international endeavor, and it is vital for
governments to anticipate and prepare to stop the next emerging
pandemic at the origin instead of just reacting and causing
long-lived destruction to our society and economy, as we
do today.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
RF, ML, JS-C, and CD jointly proposed the idea and designed
the study, performed the literature search, and collected data
for a specific section of the manuscript each. All four authors
participated in the writing and correction of the manuscript. RF
and CD made the figure.
FUNDING
The only funding sources involved are the institutions of
affiliation of each author: CIRAD for RF, the University of
Barcelona for ML and JS-C, and CNRS for CD. The involvement
of the funding sources was limited to the salaries of the authors,
with no other role or involvement.
REFERENCES
1. Huang C, Wang Y, Li X, Ren L, Zhao J, Hu Y, et al. Clinical features of
patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. Lancet.
(2020) 395:496. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30183-5
2. Zhu N, Zhang D, Wang W, Li X, Yang B, Song J, et al. A Novel Coronavirus
from patients with pneumonia in China, 2019. New Engl J. Med. (2020)
382:727–33. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa2001017
3. Afelt A, Frutos R, Devaux C. Bats, coronaviruses and deforestation:
towards the emergence of novel infectious diseases? Front. Microbiol. (2018)
9:702. doi: 10.3389/fmicb.2018.00702
4. Zhou P, Yang XL, Wang XG, Hu B, Zhang L, Zhang W, et al. A pneumonia
outbreak associated with a new coronavirus of probable bat origin. Nature.
(2020) 579:270–3. doi: 10.1038/s41586-020-2012-7
5. Anthony SJ, Johnson CK, Greig DJ, Kramer S, Che X, Wells H,
et al. Global patterns in coronavirus diversity. Virus Evol. (2017)
3:vex012. doi: 10.1093/ve/vex012
6. Afelt A, Devaux C, Serra-Cobo J, Frutos R. Bats, bat-borne
viruses, and environnemental changes. InterchOpen. (2018) 8:
113–31. doi: 10.5772/intechopen.74377
7. Afelt A, Lacroix A, Zawadzka-Pawlewska U, Pokojski P, Buchy P, Frutos R.
Distribution of bat-borne viruses and environment patterns. Infect. Genet.
Evol. (2017) 58:181–1. doi: 10.1016/j.meegid.2017.12.009
8. Cyranoski D, Abbott A. Virus detectives seek source of SARS in China’s wild
animals. Nature. (2003) 423:467. doi: 10.1038/423467a
9. Hemida MG, Chu DK, Poon LL, Perera RA, Alhammadi MA, Ng HY, et al.
MERS coronavirus in dromedary camel herd, Saudi Arabia. Emerg. Infect.Dis.
(2014) 20:1231. doi: 10.3201/eid2007.140571
10. Qiu Y, Zhao YB, Wang Q, Li JY, Zhou ZJ, Liao CH, et al. Predicting
the angiotensin converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) utilizing capability as the
receptor of SARS-CoV-2. Microbes Infect. (2020). 19:S1286–4579(20)30049-
6.doi: 10.1016/j.micinf.2020.03.003
11. Yu WB, Tang GD, Zhang L, Corlett RT. Decoding evolution and
transmissions of novel pneumonia coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2)
using the whole genomic data. Zoological Res. (2020) 41:247–57.
doi: 10.24272/j.issn.2095-8137.2020.022
12. Li X, Wang W, Zhao X, Zai J, Zhao Q, Chaillon A. Transmission dynamics
and evolutionary history of 2019-nCoV. J. Med. Virol. (2020) 92:501–
11. doi: 10.1002/jmv.25701
13. Li X, Zai J, Wang X, Li Y. Potential of large “first generation” human-
to-human transmission of 2019-nCoV. J. Med. Virol. (2020) 92:448–
54. doi: 10.1002/jmv.25693
14. Li Q, Guan, X, Wu P, Wang X, Zhou L, et al. Early transmission dynamics in
Wuhan, China, of novel coronavirus-infected pneumonia. New Engl. J. Med.
(2020) 382:1199–207. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa2001316
15. Lai A, Bergna A, Acciarri C, Galli M, ZehenderM. Early phylogenetic estimate
of the effective reproduction number of SARS-CoV-2. J.Med.Virol. (2020). 92:
675–9. doi: 10.1002/jmv.25723
16. Webster RG. Wet markets-a continuing source of severe acute
respiratory syndrome and influenza? Lancet. (2004) 363:234–
6. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(03)15329-9
17. Bray D. Designing to govern: space and power in two Wuhan communities.
Built Environ. (2008) 34:392–407. doi: 10.2148/benv.34.4.392
18. Zhang X, Cheng X. The future trend for the system reform of urban
community governance in China. Manag. Sci. Engineer. (2014) 8:89–92.
doi: 10.3968/5014
19. Liu Y, Li B. Epidemic situation of Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia in China
mainland.Medrxiv. (2020) doi: 10.1101/2020.02.17.20024034
20. Lai S, Bogoch II, Ruktanonchai N, Watts AG, Li Y, Yu J, et al. Assessing
spread risk of Wuhan novel coronavirus within and beyond China,
Frontiers in Medicine | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 223
Frutos et al. COVID-19 Dynamic
January-April 2020: a travel network-based modelling study. medRxiv.
(2020) doi: 10.1101/2020.02.04.20020479
21. Yue H, Zhu X. Exploring the relationship between urban vitality and
street centrality based on social network review data in Wuhan, China.
Sustainability. (2019) 11:4356. doi: 10.3390/su11164356
22. Gong F, Xiong Y, Xiao J. China’s local governments are combating COVID-
19 with unprecedented responses—from a Wenzhou governance perspective.
Front Med. (2020) 1–5. doi: 10.1007/s11684-020-0755-z
23. Sorn S, Sok T, Ly S, Rith S, Tung N, Viari A, et al. Dynamic of H5N1 virus
in Cambodia and emergence of a novel endemic sub-clade. Infect Genet Evol.
(2013) 15:87–94. doi: 10.1016/j.meegid.2012.05.013
24. Horm SV, Allal L, Sorn S, Buchy P. Influenza A (H5N1) virus surveillance
at live poultry markets, Cambodia, 2011. Emerg Infect Dis. (2013)
19:305. doi: 10.3201/eid1902.121201
25. Zaki AM, van Boheemen S, Bestebroer TM, Osterhaus AD, Fouchier
RA. Isolation of a novel coronavirus from a man with pneumonia in
Saudi Arabia. New Engl. J. Med. (2012) 367:1814–20. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa
1211721
26. Sabir JSM, Lam TTY, Ahmed MMM, Li L, Shen Y, Abo-Aba SE, et al.
Co-circulation of three camel coronavirus species and recombination of
MERS-CoVs in Saudi Arabia. Science. (2016) 351:81–84. doi: 10.1126/science.
aac8608
27. Müller MA, Corman VM, Jores J, Meyer B, Younan M, Liljander A, et al.
MERS coronavirus neutralizing antibodies in camels, Eastern Africa, 1983-
1997. Emerg Infect Dis. (2014) 20:2093. doi: 10.3201/eid2012.141026
28. Han HJ, Wen HL, Zhou CM, Chen FF, Luo LM, Liu JW, et al. Bats as
reservoirs of severe emerging infectious diseases. Virus Res. (2015) 205:1–
6. doi: 10.1016/j.virusres.2015.05.006
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Frutos, Lopez Roig, Serra-Cobo andDevaux. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Medicine | www.frontiersin.org 5 May 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 223
